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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
HOHI~~RT

LEE JONES,
Plaint4f and Respondent,
-vs.-

('L.\UDIUS D. KNUTSON and
~ALT LAKE CITY LINES, a Utah
Corporation,
Defendants and Appellants.

Gase No. 10163

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
STATEI\IENT OF 'THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action wherein plaintiff seeks damages
for pPrsonal injuries suffered by him when the automobile which he was driving was struck in the rear by a bus
owned by defendant Salt Lake City Lines and driven by
defendant Claudius D. Knutson.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWE,R COURT
The case was tried to a jury. From a verdict and
judgment for plaintiff, defendants appeal.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent asks only that this Court affirm the
judgment of the Trial Court.
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STATE~MENT

OF FACTS

On November 2, 1961, the plaintiff, Robert Lee
Jones, was injured when the automobile he was driving
was struck in the rear by a bus owned by the defendant
Salt Lake City Lines, and driven by defendant Claudius
D. Knutson. The accident occurred between 11th and
12th East, on 9th South, in Salt Lake City. At this point
on 9th South, the street is 61 feet 10 inches wide (R. 131),
and is divided into 4 lanes, 2 eastbound and 2 westbound
(R. 124). The eastbound lanes are divided from the westbound lanes by two yellow lines ·(R. 133), and the westbound lanes are divided by a white line (R. 145). The
inside westbound lane is 11 feet wide, and the outside
westbound lane is 19 feet 8 inches wide (R. 133). The
road surface at the scene of the accident is black top
asphalt (R. 131). Between 11th and 12th East, a distance
of 690 feet (R. 132), 9th South has a very steep slope
(R. 124). !The hill starts at 12th East and ends at 11th
East (R. 143). At the time of the accident the weather
was clear and the street was dry (R. 124). The point of
impact was in the outside westbound lane 287 feet 2
inches east of the east curb line of 11th East (R. 131).
Immediately prior to the accident, plaintiff, and a
passenger, were driving along 13th East in Salt Lake
City. At the intersection of 13th East and 9th South he
turned west and proceeded down 9th South in the outside lane of traffic (R. 144). As he proceeded down 9th
South he observed a car pull on to 9th South from the
vicinity of East High School (R.. 144). The car pulled into

y the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Lib
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

3
tlw out~idP \\'P~t hound lane, and plaintiff followed it
down thP hill. (R. 1-t-t). As the car pulled in front of
plaintiff, he noticed soine objects on top of the car.
Tht>~P ohjt>eb; later turned out to be a pair of shoes
(I L 1-t;->). rrlH· shoes fell fr01n the top of the car after it
ln\tl pa~~(·d 12th East going west on 9th South (R. 145).
Tht> ear then pulled over to the curb, and the driver, a
"·nnmn, wPnt out in the street to pick up the shoes
( 1\. 1-+3). In order to avoid hitting the woman, plaintiff
g-avP a hand signal and stopped (R,. 145, 174). Prior
to his stop he looked through his rear window for vehicles and there were none behind him (R. 174, 175). He
~toppPd with his two left wheels one or two feet to the
lPft of the line dividing the two westbound lanes (R. 145).
\YhilP stopped he opened his door and picked up a shoe
from the street (R. 145). He then rolled gradually forward (R. 17 -±) at a speed of not more than 2 or 3 miles
per hour to a point alongside the other car (R. 146). When
alongside the other car he handed the shoe to his passenger, who was handing it to the other driver when plaintiff heard two or three beeps on a horn, turned his head,
and was hit by the bus (R. 146). The impact knocked
plaintiff's car 67 feet forward (R. 131). During the slow
move forward he had his foot on the brake. He did not
make any turns, did not change lanes, and made no further hand signals. Plaintiff did not see the bus at any
time until a moment before impact (R. 149). Plaintiff's
tail lights were working and could be seen by the bus
driver from the time he first stopped, until the time of
impact (R. 189, 191). One and one-half minutes elapsed
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between the time that plaintiff stopped to pick up the
shoe and the moment of impact (R. 138, 147). Plaintiff's
car was motionless for approximately 30 seconds while
stopped next to the other car (R. 147). At the time of
the impact, plaintiff's car was in drive gear, the brakes
were on, and the taillights were working (R. 148). Pictures of the scene of the accident were admitted in evidence as exhibits 15 (R. 150, 151), 16 (R. 151, 152) 17
(R. 152) 18 (R,. 152) and 19 (R. 152, 153).
On the day of the accident defendant Knutson was
driving a 35 passenger bus, 35 feet in length (R.180). The
brakes were in good working order (R. 192). He was
carrying 28 High School students (R. 181). He made a
safety stop at 12th East and 9th South (R. 187). From
that point a person could see all of 9th South from 12th
East to 11th East (Exhibit 19, R. 152). Mr. Knutson
testified that while he was stopped at 12th East he saw
the Jones vehicle fully stopped, and the driver picking
up something from the road (R. 187). He saw the Jones
vehicle start to move forward at about the same time the
bus started to move (R. 190, 19'1), and as the Jones vehicle moved down the hill its brake lights went on and off.
(R. 189, 191). The bus brakes were applied all the way
down the hill from 12th East (R. 188).
Mr. Knutson also testified in response to his own
counsel's direct examination:
Q. Would you tell us what happened next¥
A. He made a stop. It wasn't a sudden stop, but
it was an unexpected stop. And I pressed on
the brakes, and seeing I couldn't stop sounded
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mv horn and looked to my left, and there was
a ~·ar cmning along the left, so I couldn't pull
on arouiHl, and I couldn't quite stop in time
and bu1nped in the back of his car. (R. 188)
(Italics added)
(~.

All right. When you first became aware of
the fact that Mr. Jones was going to stop at
the point where the collision took place, what
called your attention to the fact that he was
making a stop~

A.

'yell Inainly because he had stopped, because
his lights were on and off coming down t~e
hill.

Q. The lights were what~
A. The brake lights were on and off coming down
the hill. (R. 189)
ARGUME,NT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT AND
JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT AND REFUSING DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO.
7.

Defendant requested the following instruction be
gi Yen to the jury :
You are instructed that Utah law provides
that no person shall stop or suddenly decrease the
speed of a motor vehicle without first giving an
appropriate signal to the driver of any vehicle imnlediately to the rear when there is opportunity
to giYe such signal. In this regard, the mere visible light showing the application of the brakes is
not compliance with Utah law but the giving of an
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appropriate signal in this regard would require
the giving of a hand signal.
Therefore, if you find that the plaintiff in
this action stopped or suddenly decreased the
speed of his vehicle without first giving a hand
signal to the driver of the vehicle immediately to
its rear and that plaintiff further had an opportunity to give such a signal, then you will find
that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent.
The court refused this instruction. After plaintiff's evidence, defendants made a motion for a directed verdict,
which was denied. After the verdict for plaintiff defendants made a motion for a judgment notwithstanding
the verdict, which was also denied.
The basic issue raised by these motions and the requested instruction is that of the contributory negligence
of the plaintiff. In denying these motions and refusing
the instruction the trial court was following the policy
of the Supreme Court of Utah, set forth in Webb vs.
Olin Mathieson Chemical Corporation, 9 Utah 2d 275,342
P.2d 1094 (1959):
"It is the declared policy of this court to
zealously protect the right of trial by jury and
not to take issues from them and rule as a matter
of law except in clear cases."
As is the case with the question of negligence, contributory negligence is a question for the jury unless all
reasonable men must draw the same conclusions from the
facts as they are shown. Rogalski vs. Phillips Petroleum
Co., 3 Utah 2d 203, 282 P. 2d 304, (1955) ; JJ![ oore vs.
Miles, 108 Utah 167, 158 P.2d 676 (1945). See also Glenn
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vs. Oibbons & Reed Co., 1 Utah 2d 308, 265 P.2d 1013
( lV:l-1-). Contributory negligence becomes a question of
law wlH·n frmn the facts reasonable men can draw but one
infereiH't', and that inference points unerringly to the
negligeneP of the plaintiff as a contributing cause of
his injury. Cox vs. Thompson, 123 Utah 81, 254 P.2d
1047 (1953). If the court is in doubt whether reasonable
men might arrive at different conclusions, then this very
doubt determines the question to be one of fact for the
jury and not one of law for the court. Webb vs. Olin
:llathieson Chemical Corporation, supra. See also Y oshitaro Oku.dn vs. Rose, 5 Utah 2d 39, 296 P.2d 287 (1956).
In order to be guilty of contributory negligence as a
math>r of law the evidence must be undisputed, the facts
must not be conflicting, and must clearly prove~ that one
aeb:d in a 1nanner in which a reasonable prudent person
would not have acted under the circumstances. Allison
v~. JlcOarthy, 106 Utah 278, 147 P.2d 870 (1944). Only
in a ell•ar case, where all reaso~able minds would agree,
should the issue of contributory negligence be taken from
tlw jury. Compton vs. Ogden Union Ry. Depot Co., 120
Ftah -1-3~3, :235 P.2d 515· (1951). In determining whether
this plaintiff is contributorily negligent as a matter of
law, the evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom
must be Yiewed in a light most favorable to him. Cox vs.
Thompson, supra; Roach vs. Kyremes, 116 Utah 405,
~11 P.:2d 181 (1949).
~-\.t the pretrial (R. 15, 16) the defendants set forth

their contention that the plaintiff was negligent in the
following particulars:
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1. In suddenly stopping his car in the path
of the bus;

2. In failing to keep a proper lookout to the
rear when he could have seen, or should have seen
defendants' bus was immediately behind;
3.

In failing to signal his intention to stop;

and
4. In carelessly and negligently changing
from one traffic lane to another without giving
a signal of his intention to do so immediately into
the path of the bus.
These same contentions were set forth in defendants'
requested instruction No. 6 (R. 49), which was in fact
given as the court's instruction No. 8 (R. 69). Therefore,
if plaintiff had violated Sections 41-6-69' (c), 41-6-70,
or 41-6-103, Utah Code Annotated (19'53), and made a
sudden unexpected stop without a proper signal as contended by defendants, the jury could have properly found
him guilty of contributory negligence under that instruction. The evidence however, is quite to the contrary.
Plaintiff stopped in order to avoid hittiing a woman in
the road in front of him. At the time he stopped he
gave a proper hand signal. At the time he stopped he
looked through his rear window, and of course saw nothing that would be dangerous, since the bus had not yet
arrived at 12th East for its safety stop. Also the stop
was almost % of the way down the hill, without any
traffic whatsoever between plaintiff and the top of the
hill. Plaintiff did not change traffic lanes. Defendants
therefore faileq to prove any of the elements of contributory negligence that they alleged. They received the
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hl'llPl'it of any doubt when the question was put to the

vV(• havl' no quarrel with the theory that a hand
ruquired for a sudden unexpected stop under
tJw circumstances of Cnited States vs. First Sec. Bank
of Utah, :20S F.2d -±2-± (lOth cir. 1953); however, there
u.re ei n·um~tances where brake lights are a sufficient
~ignal, and may be the only appropriate signal. See Flippen v~. Jl illward, 120 Utah 373, 234 P.2d 1053 (1951).
llo\\'l'Yl'l', there was no sudden unexpected stop involved
hnt', and the aforementioned statutes do not apply. The
issue of plaintiff's contributory negligence was therefore
properly put before the jury, and the court did not err
in refusing to give defendants' requested Instruction
Ko. 7.

jury.

~ignal i~

Plaintiff made the proper signal when he made his
first stop. He also properly looked to his rear to observe
any vehicles which would have presented an immediate
hazard, and toward whon1 he owed a duty not to stop.
The bus ,,·as not there, but came along later. He therefore did not violate any statute or ordinance, and as he
moved slowly forward, he needed no further signal.
POINT' II
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN GIVING THE
JURY AN INSTRUCTION UPON THE THEORY OF LAST
CLEAR CHANCE.

The trial court gave the following instruction, at the
request of the plaintiff:

INSTRU·CTION NO. 9
Fnder certain circumstances a plaintiff is entitled to a verdict against a defendant even though
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the plaintiff be guilty of contributory negligence.
This rule of law that thus permits a negligent
plaintiff to recover judgment is known as the doctrine of last clear chance. If you determine that
the plaintiff was in fact guilty of contributory
negligence, you should then consider whether
or not the doctrine of last clear chance is applicable to this case. The doctrine of last clear
chance is applicable only if you find from a preponderance of the evidence that each of the following six propositions is true :
1.

That the plaintiff was in a position of danger.

2. That he was by reason of inattention or lack
of proper alertness totally unaware of the peril
that threatened him.
3. That the defendant actually saw the plaintiff
and knew of his perilous position.
4. That the defendant then realized or by the
exercise of due care should have realized that the
plaintiff was unaware of the danger to himself.

5. That at the time the defendant saw the plaintiff and knew of the peril to him and realized
or should have realized that the plaintiff was
oblivious to the danger, he then had a clear opportunity to· avoid the accident by the exercise
of ordinary care and \Vith his then existing ability.
There must have been an actual opportunity existing at that moment for the defendant to avoid the
accident . .Also, it must have been a fair, clear opportunity and not just a hare possibility of doing
so.
6. That the defendant then negligently failed to
avail himself of that clear opportunity and as a
proximate result the plaintiff was injured.
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lf you find that each of the above six propositions is true, the doctrine of last clear chance is
applicable to this case, and the plaintiff is entitled
to a verdict in his favor even though you find him
guilty of contributory negligence. If you find that
any one of the above six propositions is not true,
the doctrine of last clear chance has no application
and cannot be invoked by the plaintiff.
This instruction is quoted verbatim from JIF·U,
t7.:20, and properly states the law of the state of Utah.
NPP Compton vs. Ogden Union Ry. & Depot Co., supra;
Andl'rsen vs. Bingham & Garfield Ry. Co., 117 Utah 197,
:.n-t P.2d 607 (1959); Morby vs. Rogers, 122 Utah 540,
:2;):2 P.:2d 231 (1953). Whether or not the doctrine of last
elPar chance applies in a particular case depends entirely
upon the existence or nonexistence of the elements neces~ary to bring it in to play. Such question is controlled by
factual circumstances and must ordinarily he resolved by
the fact finder. Daniels vs. City & County of San Francisco, 40 Cal. 2d 61±, 255 P.2d l785 (1953). It is only when

the facts are such that all reasonable men must draw the
~mne conclusions, that -the question presented by them is
one of law for the court. Sanchez vs. Gomez, 56 N.M.
~k~~i, :25H P.:2d 3±6 (1953). In determining whether the
instant case should have been submitted on the plaintiff's
theory of last clear chance, it is the duty of the court to
eonsider the evidence in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff. Beckstrom vs. Williams, 3 Utah 2d 210, 282
P.2d 309 (1955).
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It is only when a plaintiff has been guilty of no
negligence, or if contributory negligence is not alleged
as an affirmative defense that the doctrine of last clear
chance has no application. Thomas vs. Sadler, 108 Utah
552, 162 P.2d 112 (1945).
In the instant case the questions of contributory
negligence and last clear chance were submitted to the
jury. We can assume that they found that plaintiff was
not guilty of contributory negligence or that he was so
guilty, and that the defendant had the last clear chance
to avoid the accident. Assuming therefore, for the purpose of argument, that plaintiff was guilty of contributory neg:ligence, it must be determined if the doctrine
of last clear chance applies.
The case of Graham vs. Johnson, 109 Utah 346, 166
P.2d 230 (1946), rehearing denied, 109 Utah 365, 172 P.
2d 665 (1946), is similar in nature to the instant case.
In that case the plaintiff (called Gary by the court) and
other young boys were in the street playing football,
contrary to a city ordinance. The Defendant (called Darlene by the court) drove on to the street towards the boys,
but did not sound her horn. 'The plaintiff started to run,
not knowing the defendant was there, and was hit by
defedant's car. The court assumed for the purposes of the
opinions that the plaintiff was in violation of the ordinance prohibiting playing in the street and that the defendant was negligent in failing to sound her horn or to
stop and allow the boys to become aware of her presence.
The court said at 166 P .2d 233 :
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"I ~nt sueh a violation does not permit a driver
to use the strePt in the same manner as if no person wen· playing games thereon. A duty devolves
on drivers to drive with care under the circumstancPs of the presence of boys in the street."

.\ pplying that principle to the instant case, if the plaint i rr violated a statute by stopping in the street and moving forward at a slow speed and again stopping without
a hand signal, this violation did not permit the bus
driver to use the street in the same manner as if no car
wt>re stopped there. Being aware of the car in his immediate path, the driver had a duty to drive with care
under the circumstances, especially on a steep hill with
a bus load of high school students, knowing that a car
was in front of him with its taillights flashing on and off.
Tlw court in Graham vs. Johnson, supra, indicated its
reliance on sections 479 and 480, Rest~atement of Torts,
as the rule in this state on last clear chance, and stated:

Sec. 480 deals with the situation where the
plaintiff was inattentive but had the ability, had
he been alert, to avoid the oncoming danger to
which the defendant was subjecting him. But in
both cases the liability of the defendant arose because he failed to take the opportunity which he
alone had timely to avoid doing the plaintiff harm
even though the plaintiff was negligent in getting
himself in a position where he was helpless or
because he was so inattentive that he was not alert
to the approaching danger over which defendant
had control. And in both cases to hold the defendant liable it must plainly appear to the jury that
defendant knew or reasonably should have known
of plaintiff's helpless peril or of his inattention
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and after such realization or after he reasonably,
had he been conducting himself with the vigilance required of him, should have known it, "is
negligent in failing to utilize with reasonable care
and competence his then existing ability to avoid
harming the plaintiff." In the clear chance doctrine the plaintiff's negligence has become in a
sense fixed and realizable and on to this state of
things defendant approaches on to the negligent
plaintiff with and in control of the danger.
In situations where reasonable minds must all
come to the conclusion that a defendant had ample
opportunity to utilize an existing ability to avoid
harm to the plaintiff the court should direct a
verdict for the plaintiff; in situations where
reasonable minds must all conclude that a defendant did not have such opportunity the verdict
should be directed for the defendant. In those
intermediate situations such as the supposition
under the evidence that Darlene was coming down
on the far west side of the street where· the court
is in doubt as to whether all reasonable minds
could conclude one way or the other he should
submit the case to the jury with instructions that
it should be clearly convinced that the defendant
had a clear chance, viz., ample opportunity or
clearly an existing ability at the time she reasonably should have appreciated the plaintiff's danger, to avoid harming him; otherwise it should
find for the defendant.
The court reversed the case for failure to instruct
on last clear chance.
On rehearing, the plaintiff contended that the court
had misconceived the doctrine of last clear chance. The
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court dPni!'<l the petition for rehearing, but clarified its
positioll on la~t clear chance. At 172 P.2d 667, it said:
The last clear chance duty is to do what a prudent pert)on would have done to avoid the accident had he had the opportunity, whatever that
would be, after he did or should have appreciated
the other's perils or approa~hing peril.
To revert to the instant case; Darlene was
cognizant of Gary's inattention and his unawareness that she was .approaching. He was negligent
in being where he was. She had ample opportunity
to warn him and put him on attention. To do this
timely the jury could find was a duty which she
owed to the plaintiff even in spite of his negligence and due to his situation. The jury could
find that she omitted to perform her duty. What
must she anticipate as a natural consequence of
her omission"? She must anticipate that if she is
seemingly placing Gary in increasing peril some
one may be reasonably inspired automatically to
warn him and that in response to the stimulus of
that warning, he would or might naturally seek
safety by running. What might be called the
automatic chain stems from her omission timely
to sound a warning. Nothing in this automatic
chain is an independent superseding cause. The
situation we are exposing is one where the chain
of consequences due to failure to do that which the
clear chance dictates, is automatic or semi-automatic a causation chain as in the well known
"Squibb" case, stemming from the act of negligence of the defendant which was an omission to
do what a prudent person would have done to
avoid the accident when there was a clear opportunity to do so. That omission may have been
defendant's only act of negligence but it is on
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one level and the pliantiff's on another level.
The plaintiff's negligence was continuing but
static. The defendant, who was controlling and
operating the agency of approaching danger, had
the clear chance to avoid the effect of the other's
negligence and did not do so. That was her negligence and it came after the plaintiff's negligence
had become known and fixed.
The situation in the instant case began to develop
as the bus driver stopped at 12th East, and saw the Jones
vehicle stopped in the outside lane of traffic. If it was
negligent for the plaintiff to be so stopped, or moving
slowly at that point, then his act of negligence had terminated or become static. Plaintiff was at that point in a
position of peril. The defendant bus driver saw this situation from the top of the hill, over 350 feet away, yet he
moved forward over 400 feet while the plaintiff moved
only 50 feet, and admitted that plaintiff did not stop
suddenly-only unexpectedly. At all times from the
time of the safety stop until the moment before impact,
the bus driver had a clear opportunity, had he been alert,
to avoid the accident. He was controlling and operating
the agency of approaching danger and had the last clear
chance to avoid its effect.
In each of the cases defendants cite for the proposition that last clear chance should not apply in the instant
case, the fact situation can be clearly distinguished.
Andersen vs. Bingha.m & Garfield Ry. Co., supra, involved an automobile-train collision, where the train had
defective brakes. The engineer would have had time to
stop had the brakes been in good working order. The
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court held that the instruction on last clear chance was
not applicable because the engineer did all he could pres~·ntly do undt•r the circuinstances to avoid the accident.
In the instant case there is no evidence of defective
brakP:s only l'vidence of the fact that the bus driver had
' .
a dear chance to avoid the accident, and had the means
to do so if he had been alert to the developing situation.
Compton vs. Ogden Onion Ry. & Depot Co., supra, involved a pedestrian who was struck and killed by a railroad engine. The court held that the doctrine of last
elear chance did not apply for 2 reasons: (1) that the
defendant train crew did not know, or have reason to
know of the perilous situation of the decedent, and (2)
the decedent, by the exercise of reasonable vigilance,
could have extricated herself from danger at any time
before the accident. In the instant case the defendant
was in fact aware of the danger, and the plaintiff had
no opportunity to extricate himself from the dangerous
situation. Cox v. Thompson, supra, involved a pedestrian
struck and killed by defendant's automobile at night on
a poorly lighted highway. The court held that the doctrine of last clear chance did not apply because the defendant, due to the lighting conditions, and other circumstances, did not have a clear chance to avoid the accident.
Chavroz vs. Cottrell, 12 Utah 2d 25, 361 P.2d 516 (1961),
also involved a pedestrian, who was struck and killed by
defendant's automobile. In that case the accident occurred after dark, in a dimly lighted pedestrian lane, and
the decedent was wearing dark clothing. ·The court ruled
that the defendent did not in fact have a last clear chance
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to avoid the accident. In the instant case the accident
occurred during a clear dry day, while nothing at all
to obstruct or reduce the vision of the bus driver. He
did in fact have the last clear chance to avoid the accident.
Let us then review the facts of the instant case as
they apply to the six elements of last clear chance.

1. The plaintiff was in fact in a position of danger,
being stopped in a lane of traffic.
2. The reason for his position was his own inattention or lack of proper allertness. He was totally unaware
of the peril that threatened him and had no opportunity
to extricate himself from the danger.
3. The defendant actually saw the plaintiff, and
knew of his perilous position, over 400 feet prior to the
impact.
4. 1The defendant should have realized that the
plaintiff was unaware of the danger to himself since he
had a clear view of the developing situation at all times.
5. At the time defendant first realized, or should
have realized that plaintiff was oblivious to the danger,
he had a clear opportunity to avoid the accident by the
exercise of ordinary care with his then existing ability.
He had this opportunity for over 350 feet.
6. Defendant negligently failed to avail himself of
that clear opportunity, and as a proximate result, plaintiff was injured. This is clearly a fact situation which
falls within the doctrine of last clear chance, and it
would have been error not to submit the question to the
jury.
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The issues on the contributory negligence of the
plaintil'l', and the last dear chance of the defendants to
avoid the accident, were properly submitted to the jury,
and rP~olvPd in favor of the plaintiff. Respondent theret'on• respeetfully sub1nits that the judgment of the Trial
Court should be affirmed and that he should have his
costs on appeal.
Respectfully submitted,

JOHN H. ALLE-N
Suite 201, 444 S.outh State
Salt Lake City, Utah

Attorney for Respondent
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